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SUMMARY A ENVATTING ..
Part I
INTRODUCTION AND SCOPE OF THE THESIS
1. lntroduction
2. 
Historical development
3. Categorization: issues of the thesis
4. Uncertainty reduction and physiological activity
1INTRODUCTION
Everything flows and nothing remains. These famous words are
generally ascribed to the Greek philosopher Heraclitus. He suggested
that lire is a swiftly changing flow of events, and that we never
encounter exactly the same event twice ("it is impossible to step into
the same river twice"). On the other hand, one of the Preacher's
words BarS that there is no thing new under the Bun (Ecclesiastes
1:9). The statements seem to contradict each other, yet bath of them
have been quoted approvingly many times. How can they be reconciled?
Indeed, each event or entity we experience is unique. However,
we do not usually act as if we are constantly being overwhelmed by
totally new impressions, not knowing how to respond to them. We
recognize written words despite variation in handwriting, even
handwriting we have never Been before. And when entering an animal
shop, we identify same animals as puppies, other ones as parrots, and
the salesperson as a man or a woman. Following this categorization,
we know more about what 'Ne can reasonably expect from their behaviour.
We know how to respond to them on the basis of past learning and
categorization, due to the conceptual system most of us are endowedwith.
The conceptual system encompasses a great deal of information
about the environment. Information trom the environment is reduced to
behaviorally and cognitively usable proportions. Reduction of the
complexity of the world around us is necessary, because -if not
impossible- it is at least impractical to retain all of the specific
information about each and everything we experience. Human memory
stores representations derived trom a wide class of perceived objects
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that generally embody the frequently repeated themes of our experi-
ence. Knowledge in memory is organized around these representations,
the category concepts. Concepts are essentially alinguistic. How-
ever, through language learning, concepts may acquire names. The use
of categorical concepts is a most important factor in human life. It
enables us to cope effectively with the environment by treating dif-
ferent things as the same, by abstracting from the ideosyncrasies of
particular experiences. As Bruner, Goodnow and Austin (1956) put it:
"To categorize is to render discriminably different things
as equivalent, to group objects and events and people around
us into classes, and to respond to them in terms of their
class membership rather than their uniqueness." (p.l)
They pointed out that virtually all cognitive activity involves and is
dependent on, the process of categorizing. In short, category con-
cepts provide the classificatory system necessary to interact effi~
ciently with the environment. Categories are essential as a means of
handling large quantities of information. They determine the war we
perceive, remember, communicate and think about objects and events.
What are the principles with which we divide up the world in the
war that we do? How are categories put into memory, how are they
coded? The type of categories studied in the present thesis,
represent only part of the information people normally encounter. The
categories of concern here are the kind of categories based on the
grouping together of concrete physical objects. The study focuses on
a number of factors with potential influence on learning and using
categories. In Chapter 2, the historical development of theories and
experimental studies on categorization will first be shortly con-
sidered. Then, in Chapter 3, the main theoretical issues addressed by
the present study will be introduced.
A second topic of the study touches on the relationship of mind
and brain. Connections between cognitive processes and neural func-
tioning are explored. Attention will be given to this subject in
Chapter 4.
The thesis is divided into three parts. Part I is an outline of
the scope of the thesis. For convenience, the issues of the experi-
mental studies are all put together in this Part. Next, each of the
issues again will be dealt with in one or more of the Chapters of Part~
4
11. Part 11 consists of the experimental studies. Chapter 5 and 6
have already been published in ~ Psychologica, 1981, ~, 1-24, and
1984, ~, 165-192, respectively (except for section 6.3.). Chapter 7
is in press, and is due to appear in ~ Psychologica, 1986, ~:!.
In part 111 of the thesis, the results of the studies are compiled and
discussed. Finally, a summary of the thesis is given.
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2. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT
The study of categorization emerged within the field of psycho-
logical learning theory. A braad distinction can be made between ear-
lier associationistic stimulus-response (S-R) theories and later
hypothesis-testing theories. The post-l950s tradition of cognitive
psychology led to a preference of the active hypothesis-testingmodels. 
The behaviourist tradition prior to the cognitive shift
entailed the passive associationistic account of the category learningprocess.
2.1. Associationism
--
In the psychological literature, Rull (1920) advanced the "common
element" view of category concepts. Ris theory was an associationis-
tic S-R theory. In his theory, category learning involves the forma-
tion of an association between a certain response and an element com-
mon to a class of different stimuli. The category learner is viewed
as passively undergoing a series of experiences which gradually bring
about these associations, by reinforcement. Rull's opinions were
formed in the behaviouristic climate of his time. In this tradition
the unobservable internal processes of the organism were ignored and
considered as a subject unsuitable for the scientific enterprise.
Throughout the 1950s, the passive and mechanical associationistic
account of the category learning process prevailed. S-R theories,
however, appeared to be too simplistic to account for the processes of
category learning. The S-R approach does not account for central, or
thought processes that may influence the category learner's response
6
to the information presented in the stimulus
~.~. 
Hypothesis testing
About 1955, the S-R concept became replaced by the input-output
concept. This shift was not merely a linguistic one. It was recog-
nized that a complex program controlled the input-output sequence
(Milier, Galanter and Pribram, 1960), and this opened the way for new
approaches to the study of cognitive processes. Another type of
theory was proposed, according to which the organism is Been as
actively seeking information. According to this view, categories are
learned via an active, strategic process of forming and testinghypotheses. 
Bruner, Goodnow and Austin (1956) advanced this view.
They provided an analysis of the nature of categorizing and Lts cen-
tral role in cognition. They tried to externalize the thought
processes of people when learning to categorize. They broke with the
behaviouristic tradition by verifying the existence of hypothesis
testing behaviour. From observed behaviour of the subjects they
inferred certain patterns of purposive behaviour which they called"strategies". 
The notion of strategies enabled them to describe what
the subject does "internally" when learning new classifications.
The work of Bruner c.s. brought about fundamental changes in
category learning theory, and stimulated an intensive analysis of the
variables affecting and of the processes underlying category learning.
The process by which subjects learn a category concept was accepted to
be ODe of forming hypotheses, which are tested and revised in the
light of information from experience.
A typical method to study the process of category learning will
be described next. It was realized that sometimes categories are
learned by examples. People of ten have no controlover which
instances are presented to them. Exemplars and non-exemplars are
pointed out to them as they happen to occur. In that case, a logical
way to learn the category is by following a kind of reception stra-
tegy. This involves adopting a hypothesis, based on either the whole
or a part of the first category example, and knowing how and when to
alter it whenever new information is presented. To study the
strategies actually adopted by subjects in these circumstances, Bruner
designed the following task. The task is described here because it
has since been used as a standard procedure. Visual stimuli were con-
structed that subjects had to learn to classify into categories.
Categories were defined by the experimenter. For example, the subject
was shown a series of geometric figures that differed in the dimen-
sions farm (with values circle and square), colour (red and blue) and
size (small and large). A category could then be defined by all red
circles, for instance, leaving size as an irrelevant dimension. The
subject was asked to classify each figure presented. Following each
classification the subject was told whether or not it was correct.
Learning taak place from this feedback information. It was inferred
that the subject had identified the category when no more classifica-
tion errors were made. Therefore, learning trials continued until the
subject consistently responded correctly.
The main measures of learning performance were the number of tri-
als taken to reach a solution and the number of categorization errors
made during learning. Stimulus factors, like the number of relevant
and/or irrelevant dimensions, the number of values on the dimensions,
and the type and complexity of the rule defining the category, were
studied, as weIl as procedural factors, such as the order of presenta-
tion of the stimuli and the amount and nature of feedback to the sub-
ject. Many of these variables and their combinations have been shown
to affect classification learning. The investigations also dealt with
the kinds of hypotheses subjects entertained during learning and how
these hypotheses were revised on the basis of feedback.
A number of models have been developed of the way in which a sub-
ject might choose among a pool of hypotheses. Early models (Restie,
1962; Bower and Trabasso, 1964) assumed that the subject begins a
learning task with a universe of hypotheses from which he draws one.
This hypothesis dictates bis response. The subject retains the
hypothesis if bis response turns out to be correct, but discards it
and selects another one if hLS response is wrong. A disconfirmed
hypothesis is supposed to be returned to the pool. Later experiments
refuted the assumption of no memory for previously tested hypotheses
(a.o. Levine, 1966).
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A more elaborate version of hypothesis-testing theory bas been
formu1ated by Levine (1969). This theory assumes that the subject
begins a learning task by sampling a subset from the universe ofhypotheses. 
He then takes ODe hypothesis from the subset as the work-
ing hypothesis, on which he bases bis response. The working
hypothesis is retained if the response is correct. If the response iswrong, 
the working hypothesis is discarded, and a new working
hypothesis is chosen from the subset. If the subset is empty, the
subject takes a new subset of several hypotheses and chooses a new
working hypothesis from this subset. Other hypotheses from the subset
are updated simultaneously af ter each feedback. These hypotheses are
eliminated from the subset when they turn out to be wrong. In con-
trast to the no-memory assumption of the early roDdels, Levine's theory
assumed that subjects do eliminate hypotheses from the pool, at least
for some time. In the course of time, subjects may forget that some
of the hypotheses were disconfirmed. These hypotheses then become
part of the pool again. The weight of empirical evidence supports
Levine's theory (e.g. Levine, 1975; De Swart and Das-Smaal, 1976,
1979; Bourne, Dominowski and Loftus, 1979) We will return to the sub-
set assumption of Levine's theory in experiment 2 and 4 in Chapter 5.
The question of the nature of the information that is stored in
memory when a category concept is learned did not receive much atten-
tion in the earlier studies. It was taken for granted that categories
simply consist of defining values and it was assumed that categoriza-
tion is based on rules for combining these values. The emphasis was
laid on the learning process rather than on structure. In the lastdecade, 
the trend of research on categorization changed to focus on
the issue of what is stored in memory, thereby questioning the idea of
defining value representation. The shift went together with more
interest in natural, real-life categories.
The stimulus material traditionally used bas been criticized for
its artificiality and its simplicity. Stimuli were based on a few
discrete values on a small number of completely independent stimulus
q
dimensions. Boundaries between dimensional values were always clear-
cut, and no variation occurred within values. However, these boun-
daries in daily life are of ten unclear. An illustration of fuzzy
boundaries comes from an experiment of Labov (1973). Labov studied
the boundaries of the cup category. He was interested in the items
that subjects, given a series of items, would call cups, and which
ODes they would call bowls. The items reflected an increasing ratio
of width to depth. Subjects were asked to classify pictures of the
objects. With increasing relative width there was a gradual shift
trom cup to bowl responses, but there was no clear-cut point where
subjects stopped using cup. Even more interesting was that when sub-
jects were asked to imagine the object placed on a table and filled
with food, more bowl responses were given, though the same gradual
shift appeared from cup to bowl. Thus, boundaries not only caD be
unclear, but they caD also be influenced by the context in which some-
thing is placed. Unclear boundaries between dimensional values are
also illustrated by the colour dimension. Colours vary along a con-
tinuum in which for instance, red gradually becomes orange, and orange
gradually becomes yellow.
Apart from unclear boundaries, there is another significant point
to discuss. Even with variants of a dimensional value that everyone
would agree belongs to the same value, same variants are more typical
of the value than others. Thus., a good red is more typical of the
colour red than same less focal shade of red.
Finally, in natural categories, dimensional values are not always
independent of each other. Same values more of ten occur together in a
category than they occur with other values. As Bruner et al. (1956)
already put it in their discussion of complexity of learning mater i-
als, the (defining) values of most objects are redundant with respect
to each other. Four wheels and metal, for example, more of ten co-
occur in cars than three wheels and plastic.
Simple artificial material may thus lack relevance or ecologicalvalidity. 
However, with complex everyday material an objective
assessment of categorization behaviour may not be possible, since it
is not known what information is available for making the categoriza-
tion, because the stimuli cannot be exactly specified. In the earlier
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studies, ecological validity tended to be sacrificed. There bas been
a reversal of this trend the last decade.
The traditional studies were also criticized for the "defining
values" view of category concepts on which they were based. Instead
it was felt that natural language categories of ten lack a common
defining element. This idea is borrowed from Wittgenstein (e.g.
Johnson-Laird and Wagon, 1977). It is usually illustrated with the
example of the proceedings that we call 'games' (board-games, card-
games, hall-games, Olympic Games, and so on). 'Games' are not all
classified according to the same defining property. Rather, games are
linked by a family resemblance. In a family resemblance structure,
category exemplars share a large proportion of their values, but do
not necessarily agree in any one value.
.?:..~. ~ approach
Implicit in the earlier studies was the idea that categories are
specified by necessary and sufficient conditions for membership, and
that all category members are equally typical or representative of the
category, In the new approach to the study of categories, the vali-
dity of these assumptions has been questioned, The new approach was
instigated by the work of Rosch (Rosch, 1973, 1975; Rosch and Mervis,
1975). Rosch studied the characteristics of natural categories. Her
work combined ideas from different social sciences, i.e. linguistics,
anthropology, PbJchology, and particularly from two research areas,viz. 
semantic memory and schema formation.
At the time, semantic memory models still assumed that categories
exist of sets of defining values. Nevertheless, it began to be recog-
nized that not all category exemplars are equally typical. Lakoff
(1973) suggested that the absolute dichotomy between truth and falsity
regarding category membership should be replaced by a continuous truthdimension. 
In his view, semantic relations are a matter of degree
rather than all-or-none. Lakoff showed that various qualifying terms,
such as "almost", "true", "technically", "regular", each are applica-
ble to only a subset of category exemplars. Speakers use the terms to
signal degrees of category membership. For instance, it is acceptable
11
to say that a whale is technically a mammal, but not that a cow is
technically a mammal, because a cow is more than just that, it is a
typical instance of a mammal. Likewise, the sentence "a sparrow is a
true bird" is acceptable, but "a penguin is a true bird" is not. In
order to account for these expressions, it is necessary to recognize
the nonequivalence of instances. This is what Smith, Shoben and Rips
(1974) did in their model of semantic memory, the feature-comparisonmodel. 
According to this model, categories are represented not only
by defining values, but also by 50 cal led characteristic, non-
necessary values. Exemplars that have many of the characteristic
values of a category are considered to be more typical than those that
do not. Rosch joined the idea of typicality differences among exem-
plars as a feature of natural categories.
The other assumption in traditional studies that bothered Rosch
was that of necessary and sufficient conditions for membership. This
assumption was avoided in the prototype modeis. Prototype models
stemmed from the area of schema format ion research. The view that
in format ion is stored by means of a schema was advocated by Bartlett
(1932). According to Bartiett, information is not simply retained in
its full detail. Instead, a schema is abstracted, which subsequently
organizes incoming information.
Posner and Keele (1968, 1970) studied prototype abstraction withnonverbal, 
ill-defined categories. They used simple dot patterns,
that did not allow for an obvious classification rule. Categories
were produced by applying distortions to a prototype, that represented
the central tendency of the category (i.c. the average of the set ofdistortions). 
The distortions implied that dots of the prototype
moved to new positions in accordance with same statistical rule. Sub-
jects learned to categorize the distorted patterns. Posner and Keele
showed that subjects generate amental representation of the prototype
even when that specific pattern was never actually presented to them
during learning. It bas also been found that the unseen prototype was
more resistant to forgetting than were the originally presented pat-
terns (Strange et al., 1970).
In the prototype approach, the representation of a category is
thus taken to be the result of an abstraction process. It is
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generally assumed that different category exemp1ars are integrated
into one memory structure, i.e. a summary description of the category.
This description is used whenever a decision about category membership
bas to be made. In contrast to the traditional view it is furthermore
thought that category representation is not restricted to a set of
defining va1ues. For a va1ue to be inc1uded in the summary, it need
on1y be characteristic of the category. Prototype mode1s agree onthat. 
However, the mode1s differ in their assumption on exact1y what
is abstracted. They differ in the nature of the summary description.
Posner and Kee1e have made a case for the abstraction of average
va1ues on the exemp1ars that were experienced during category 1earn-
ing. The prototype need not be an existing exemp1ar. It might be
composed of va1ues never experienced, because it bas the mean va1ue on
every dimension that varies among the experienced exemp1ars. Another
conception of prototype composition can be found in frequency mode1s
(a.o. Neumann, 1974). In these mode1s, a prototype is assumed to be
based on frequency of occurrence of va1ues among the experienced exem-p1ars, 
and not on the average of va1ues a1ong a dimension. Peop1e
farm prototypes composed of the moda1 frequencies of the va1ues of the
experienced members of the category. A1though the va1ues themse1ves
must have of ten been experienced, the combination of the va1ues need
not actua11y be perceived.
It is the work of Rosch that applied prototype theory to natural
categories, the implicit concepts of daily life. Rosch proposed that
natural categories are represented as prototypes or best exemplars,
surrounded by other members of decreasing representativeness. The
more typical members have more of the characteristic values than oth-
era. Specifically, Rosch hypothesized that typicality of a category
member is determined by its family resemblance to other members of the
same category. A high faaily resemblance means that a large number of
values is shared with the other members, while at the same time few
values are shared with contrasting categories. Thus, the best exam-
pies of one category will not be good representatives of othercategories. 
Furthermore, atypical exemplars or category members on
the boundaries, are not clearly either members or non-members.
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Boundaries are usua11y fuzzy.
With a variety of experimenta1 methods, Rosch and her associates
investigated the memory representation of natura1 categories. From
their experiments it appeared, for instance, that subjects can re1i-
ab1y rate the extent to which a member of a category fits their idea
of the meaning of the category name. Typica1ity differences were
found, 1ike achair being a better examp1e of furniture than a lamp or
a piano. They a1so used the priming technique. Priming in studies of
cognition refers to the triggering of specific memories by a particu-
lar cue. Thus, the advance presentation of a category name may to a
greater or les ser degree, faci1itate subsequent matching performance
with cues re1ated to the prime. With this technique they have shown
that the representation generated by the category name is more 1ike
members rated as good examp1es than those rated as paar examp1es of
the category. Furthermore, feature 1istings and typica1ity ratings of
various items within a given category showed that the more features an
item has in common with other members, the more it is considered a
typica1 member of the category. The resu1ts generally support the
empirica1 va1idity of Rosch's idea that natura1 categories have an
interna1 structure, in which members are ordered according to the
degree to which they are judged to be "good examp1es" of the category.
The interna1 structure is governed by princip1es of categoriza-
tion. Categorizing is aimed at what Rosch ca11s "cognitive economy".
This means that on one hand categories shou1d pres erve information
about the environment as much as possib1e, but on the other hand -to
minimize cognitive 10ad -they shou1d reduce the infinite differences
among stimuli to manageab1e proportions. In other words, the aim is
to maximize the information accounted for, and to keep at a minimum
the number of categories that have to be distinguished. Economya1so
implies a maximization of intercategorica1 differences, so that the
categories wi11 be maxima11y distinctive. In this context the concep-
tion of hierarchica1 organization of categories is of relevance.
Rosch claims that natura1 categories are hierarchica11y re1ated.
Larger categories usua11y contain a number of smaller ones. Three
levels are distinguished. Superordinate categories, such as c10thing,
contain basic-level categories (e.g. trousers), which in turn contain~
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subordinate categories (e.g. Levi's). Cognitive economy is maximized
at the basic level. Therefore, the basic level is considered the most
important. At this level, more in format ion is preserved than at the
higher level because members of a basic category have more in common.
At the same time, differences among objects are reduced as compared
with the lower level categories. The subcategories of a basic
category have only small specific differences because their members
share many values. Basic categories are most important in language
and they are the first categories we learn. The claims concerning a
basic level can be formalized in terms of cue validity (a.o. Beach,
1964). Cue validity is a probabilistic concept indicating the predic-
tive validity of a dimensional value of a category. Cue validity is
based on frequency of occurrence of values bath in the focal and in
other categories. A category exemplar with a high total cue validity
is more differentiated from other categories than one of lower total
cue validity. Cue validity is maximized at the basic level. In this
thesis the concept of cue validity will be used and further described
in Chapter 6 and 7.
Another principle of categorization asserts that the environment
is perceived to possess a correlational structure. In the criticism
on traditional studies we have already mentioned that the combinations
of what we perceive as dimensional values are not equiprobable.
Rather, same values co-occur more than others. Rosch argues that
categories tend to be formed that mirror the structure perceived in
the environment. However, elsewhere she recognizes that it mayalso
be the case that this structure is something that is imposed on regu-
larities in nature by our conceptualizing minds (Rosch, 1978). Co-
occurrence of dimensional values will be one of the main issues in
Chapter 7.
The point of correlational structure is also emphasized by Ander-
Bon (1985). Anderson describes the structure of natural categories as
a schematic structure, and asserts that schemas represent (among other
things) our knowledge about how dimensional values tend to go together
to define objects. Thus according to Anderson, it is the interrela-
tional structure, the configuration of dimensional values, rather than
just a list of values that defines a category. Incidentally, Anderson
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states that part of the object schema mayalso be functional in forma-
tion. This is an aspect that bath traditional and prototype theorists
have of ten neglected (de Swart, 1982).
The use of a schema framework bas become widespread in psycholog-
ical research. At the same time interest is now growing in complex,
composite categories (Mil lward , 1980; Mandler, 1984; Medin and Smith,
1984). Research on categorization bas been dominated by the usage of
simple categories. However, these categories can be further
integrated and related to each other to farm more complex organiza-
tions of knowledge. Such elaborated, interconnected knowledge struc-
tures are most generally referred to as schemas, although the schema
notion implies also an active organizing principle. Not just
categories can be coded by schemas. Events, stories and scenes, can
also be represented by schematic farms of organization. In that case,
spatio-temporal relations are important parts of the schemas. These
complex knowledge structures, however, are beyond the scope of this
thesis. We will now turn to the issues to be studied in this dis ser-
tation.
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3. CATEGORIZATION
3.1. Theoretical issues--
In Chapter 2.4 it was mentioned that the classical view on
categories entails the idea of category representation by definingvalues. 
Defining values are bath necessary and (jointly) sufficient
to define the category. If there is more than one defining value, the
values are combined by same rule (e.g. conjunction or disjunction) to
determine category membership. The classical view has been severely
criticized for the defining value notion (e.g. Rosch, 1975), and
although none of the criticisms has been utterly decisive (see for
instance Martin and Caramazza, 1980), it has led many investigators to
alternative views, mainly prototype ones. New research questions came
up, such as what determines a prototype and what information is used
in the classification of new exemplars. Stimulus materials were
changed. Instead of artificial stimuli, e.g. geometrical figures,
subjects became importuned with real lire materials, such as birds,
races and pieces of furniture. Furthermore, different experimental
paradigms were adopted in order to meet the research questions.
However, before totally shifting the helm and abandoning the
defining values notion entirely, it would be interesting to know what
the influence of typicality is on a traditional category learning task
with defining values. The question of interest is whether it can be
shown that categories that are learned in the traditional way, with
membership being sufficiently specified just by defining values, may
nevertheless acquire an internal structure that favours typical
members over less typical ones. Of course, this can only come about
18
if subjects are given proper information from which it is possible to
derive typicality differences among exemplars. With well-defined
categories, it is then quite conceivable that defining values enter
into the category representation, but this does not rule out the pos-
sibility that other information is also represented. Thus, typicality
effects may not be inconsistent with the traditional view if they caD
be shown to occur with a category learning task that conforms to the
traditional Brunerian design.
However, apart from that, it may be the case that it is not
definingness in a strict sense that makes up the crucial variabie.
This could be rather some related but less rigid measure of variabil-
ity, such as for instance the degree to which a dimensional value is
representative, i.e. occurring of ten but not always among categorymembers. 
Definingness may then simply be the maximum degree of
representativeness. This avoids the problem of whether or not people
are able to specify the defining values or whether or not they ulti-
mately have defining values represented. At the same time it has the
advantage of accounting for differences among category members in
goodness of example. The problem then remains just what it is that
determines representativeness or typicality. This will be investi-
gated in the experiments in Chapter 6 and 7 of the present thesis.
As a starting point, two experiments in Chapter 5 have been
designed to apply typicality variation to a classical learning problem
with defining values, employing both traditional and more realistic
stimulus materials. Thus the experiments attempt to provide a bridge
between the traditional concept identification studies and the more
recent developments on the organization of knowledge in more natural
categories.
Natural category exemplars may vary in the degree to which they
are typical of the category. An apple, for instance, is thought to be
more "fruit-like" than a watermelon, and a sparrow is a more typical
bird than a turkey. Typicality differences among category members
have been established in numerous studies (a.o. Smith et al., 1974;
Rosch, 1975). In these studies it has, for instance, been shown that
subjects agree in their typicality judgments of category members, and
that the typicality ratings predict reaction time to verify category
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membership. 
The question of what determines this typicality variation
is important because its answer will offer insights into the basis of
category structure. The central concern of the present dissertation
is variation amongst exemplars within the same category. Different
aspects of within-category variation may contribute to the way that a
category is remembered following experience with exemplars and non-exemplars. 
The present study addresses these aspects and their influ-
ence on learning and subsequent usage of categories.
In particular, two main aspects are focused on. One aspect con-
cerns the frequency of occurrence of dimensional values. The other
aspect is the similarity of variants of a dimensional value to a pro-
totypical value (e.g. various triangular forms to a prototype trian-gle). 
This aspect will be cal led typicality of value variants. To
distinguish between typicality based on frequency of values and vari-
ant typicality, these typicalities will next be referred to as
representativeness and (variant) typicality, respectively.
3.1
Maximization of cue validity was suggested by Rosch (1973) to be
a determining factor regarding the internal structure of a category.
According to this principle, the best examp1es of categories are those
exemplars that have the most in common with other members of the same
category, and share the least with contrasting categories. It is the
latter addition that constitutes a particularly important research
issue in the present thesis. When people learn a category, do they
use information on contrasting categories at all when forming the
focal category? And if so, then what information do they use, what
effect does it have on the category to be learned?
It is of ten assumed that in learning a category, the learner
keeps track of the frequencies with which va1ues occur within thatcategory. 
Indeed, there is substantial evidence for accumulation of
frequency information during category 1earning (a.o. Neumann, 1974;
Goldman & Homa, 1977; Hayes-Roth & Hayes-Roth, 1977; Chumbley et al.,
1978; Ke110gg et al., 1978). One could argue then, that in a category
representation the dimensional values represented are the ones that
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occur most of ten among category members. This is in tact what Neumann
(1974) tor instance proposed in bis attribute-frequency model.
According to bis model, a category prototype is formed that contains
the maximal number of the most frequently experienced values.
Occurrence of values within one category may be of relevance in
the representation of that category. However, it could equally weIl
be the case that it is just what distinguishes a category trom other
categories that makes up the important information. In this view,
when a category is being learned, the learner pays particular atten-
tion to those values that provide the sharpest contrast with other,
related categories. These so-called distinctive values may next
become central to the category representation. In that view, a
category representation not only contains information on occurrence in
the focal category, but also on occurrence in contrasting categories.
The lat ter information can of course only be learned when contrasting
categories are experienced in addition to the category to be learned.
In the latter view, contrasting categories are useful in a learning
phase, because they provide information on the occurrence of dimen-
sional values outside the focal category. Distinctiveness trom other
categories is not always accounted tor in categorization modeis. It
is however accounted tor in models that have cue validity as a criti-
cal term, such as tor instance the property-set model proposed by
Hayes-Roth and Hayes-Roth (1977). As mentioned in 2.4, cue validity
can be defined as the frequency with which a cue, or a dimensional
value, occurs in one category, divided by the total frequency of that
cue across all categories. Cue validity thus takes into account the
resemblance within a category, as weIl as distinctiveness trom con-
trasting categories.
In the category learning tasks of the experiments described in
Chapter 6 and 7, frequency of dimensional values will be varied bath
in the focal and in the contrasting category. As tor occurrence in
the focal category, a high frequency of values is assumed to facili-
ta te categorization performance. In addition, the influence of
occurrence in a contrasting category will be investigated extensively
on the following hypothesis. Frequency of values in the contrasting
category will affect categorization performance and representativeness~
ratings. 
Category exemplars will be categorized more easily and will
be judged more representative, the lower the frequency of their com-
posing values in the contrasting category was during learning. The
influence will be studied bath by varying frequency in the contrasting
category and by either including or not including a contrast category
in the learning task.
In Chapter 6 also a delay of testing variable will be introduced
in order to test whether values that appear to be most important to
categorization are also the most resistant to forgetting.
l.l..?. 
Conjoint frequency
Another controversial issue regarding frequency of occurrence is
whether or not subjects learn about each dimensional value indepen-
dently of the other values. The question is, whether or not frequency
of co-occurrence of dimensional values affects category formation.
Rosch et al. (1976) have claimed that the perceived world comes as
structured information rather than as arbitrary, equiprobable co-
occurring values. Values that characterize the members of natural
categories are of ten correlated, and these conjoint frequencies are
mirrored in the categories that people farm. The suggestion that con-
joint frequency affects categorization bas also been made by Hayes-
Roth and Hayes-Roth (1977) and by Medin and Schatter (1978).
Kellogg (1981), on the other hand, states th.~t stimulus dimen-
sions are independently represented, and that only simple frequencies
are counted. There bas not much research been done on this topic.
One study, a category learning experiment of Kellogg (1981), failed to
produce conjoint frequency effects. In Kellogg's study, however, the
values with which conjoint frequency was varied, were all irrelevant
to categorization. The possibility remains tbat conjoint frequency
effects will show up when relevant values are concerned. This ques-
tion will be tackled in Chapter 7.
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~.!.~. Feedback information
Feedback information in category learning experiments usually
offers the subject information on the category to which an itembelongs. 
Any other information, such as "this is a good example", or
"this one is not very representative of the category'" is withheld.
However, suppose that the category learner is given such additional
information as to the goodness of example of an item. Would this
information be useful, i.e. by facilitating the process of category
learning, or by improving categorization performance afterwards? It
is conceivable that the learner will profit from this extra informa-
tion, because information on the category structure is ncw directly
given, whereas otherwise this can only be experienced indirectly from
the exemplars themselves. The hypothesis on the use of information on
representativeness of an exemplar in addition to the normal feedback
will be investigated in the experiments described in Chapter 6 and 7.
l..!..~. Typicality ~ ~ variants
As mentioned in 3.1.1., frequencyof occurrence of values bas
been shown to be an important variabie in category learning, and
models have been based on this. However, in contrast to frequencymodeis, 
distance models of categorization predict that prototypes are
formed on the basis of Borne multidimensional mean rather than mode.
Studies that have compared both types of model do not unequivocally
favour ODe or the other type of model (Martin & Caramazza, 1980; Reed,
1972), although frequency models seem to have the most empirical sup-
port (Goldman & Homa, 1977; Hayes-Roth & Hayes-Roth, 1977; Neumann,
1977; Chumbley et al., 1978). The kind of dimensional values used in
a category learning task may be relevant to this state of affairs.
The kind of dimensional values -discrete or continuous- places
constraints on what information caD be gathered to represent
categories. When discrete values are employed, variability in
category exemplars most probably results from varying the frequency of
occurrence of those values. On the other hand, when continuous values
are used, variation amongst category exemplars mayalso result from
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varying the typicality of value variants. If dimensional values vary
continuously, then each value is determined by same allowable range of
variation. Continuous values may vary in typicality within certain
ranges, but apart trom that they may vary regarding their overall fre-
quency of occurrence in a category. Thus there may be a case tor bathmodels. 
The human classificatory system may be flexible enough to
allow bath tor frequency and tor variant typicality variation. It is
the concurrent influence of frequency and variant typicality variation
that will be investigated in the present dissertation. The idea is
that bath types of model apply. However, they do so in different
aspects of within-category variation. Frequency variation has been
described in 3.1.1 and 3.1.2. In the same learning tasks in which
frequency will be varied, typicality of variants will be manipulated
in order to determine concurrent effects. If it can be shown that
bath variables are effective in the same category, then it can be con-
cluded that these variables are not mutually exclusive, but rather
that they represent different aspects of the same category learningprocess.
Typicality of value variants tor all kinds of stimulus materials
to be used in the experiments of the present thesis, were established
in preliminary studies. In Chapter 5, the main purpose of typicality
variation is to examine whether the typicality phenomenon that exists
in natural categories, can be also demonstrated within the kind of
well-defined categories traditionally employed in studies on category
learning. Next, in Chapter 6 and 7, typicality of variants will be
manipulated together with frequency of occurrence of dimensionalvalues. 
The focal categories in these experiments are ill-defined in
that dimensional values are combined in a way that excludes a category
representation by common and defining values. Typicality is expected
to influence categorization, such that increasing variant typicality
has a facilitating effect on categorization performance. Typicality
effects will be further studied by varying the range on which variant
typicality is varied in the learning task.
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~.!..~. ~ ~ typicality
Another problem that bas not received much attention in studies
on category learning is the format ion of category boundaries. This
issue is obviously related to within-category variation. ODe may
assume that categories are represented by prototypes, surrounded by
exemplars of decreasing representativeness. ODe may further ack-
nowledge that category boundaries are mostly vague rather than clear-cut. 
However, this leaves open the question of the ultimate range of
discrepancies among category exemplars that a person is willing toaccept. 
For example, an opening in a wall with glass in it is usually
cal led a window. However, it is questionable whether, if the opening
is only ODe inch wide, it would still be categorized as a window.
Context may be of relevance here. In 2.3. we mentioned the study of
Labov on boundaries of the cup category. In that study, ODe factor
influencing the boundary appeared to be context. The cup boundary was
not the same in different contexts. Likewise, the ODe inch opening
may be cal led a window depending on the context. For instance, it is
a regular window when it is part of a doll's house. This is an exam-
ple of a factor of influence on category boundaries once theyare
formed. It shows that boundaries are flexible because they are con-
text dependent. The problem to be studied in this thesis, however,
concerns boundary formation. How is experience related to categorywidth? 
People caD use narrow, moderate, or wide categories for clas-
sification, and it is hypothesized that this is influenced by prior
experience on category exemplars.
3.2. Line of research
The experiments described in Chapter 5 farm an extension of the
classical line of experimentation in category learning to more complex
and more realistic category members. Employing a conventional
category learning paradigm (see 2.2), typicality of value variants is
manipulated in traditional well-defined categories. Typicality will
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be 
varied bath for relevant (defining) and for irrelevant values. In
this situation, like in traditional studies, subjects most probably
learn the relevant values, which amounts to solving the learning prob-iem. 
However, it is also hypothesized that learning performance will
be influenced by value typicality. That is, learning will be easier
when the relevant values are typical rather than atypical, but the
reverse will hold for irrelevant values. Furthermore, the idea that
subjects have about category members following learning is supposed to
be affected by typicality.
To study the effects of typicality, the meaningless artificial
stimuli traditionally used were employed in one study. These con-
sisted of unconnected, arbitrarily arranged separable dimensions. In
order to compare traditional material with more real-life stimuli, the
experiment was replicated with more meaningful realistic unitarymaterial.
The older research tradition on categorization bas been espe-
cially profitable because it studied hypothesis formation. From many
traditional studies it appeared that people solve concept identifica-
tion problems by formulating and testing hypotheses (e.g. Bower and
Trabasso, 1964; Levine, 1975; De Swart and Das-Smaal, 1976; 1979).However, 
people usually are not capable of keeping track of all possi-
bie hypotheses at one time. Levine (1969) suggested that from all
possible hypotheses a subset is chosen. This multiple-hypothesis
sampling theory was described in Chapter 2. The category learning
tasks to be described in Chapter 5 offer an opportunity to test an
implication of Levine's theory.
Concurrent effects of frequency of occurrence of dimensional
values and typicality of value variants are the subject in the experi-
ments described in Chapter 6 and 7. The experimental paradigm used to
study these effects consists of a learning phase. followed by a testphase.
In the learning phase. subjects are shown items ODe by oDe from a
mixed set of bath category exemplars and non-exemplars. The
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categories are experimenter-defined. Feedback indicates the correct
classification for each item, thereby providing the information neces-
sary for category learning.
In the test phase, subjects are asked to categorize all kinds of
items, including navel instances that they have not studied. The
nature of the information acquired during experience with the learning
items will be evaluated from performance on the test items. The test
phase is comprised of a categorization test and also a pairwise com-
parison task. In this task, exemplars from the focal category are to
be compared on representativeness of that category. At the conclusion
of each experiment, subjects are asked to mention the characteristic
features of the category to be learned, in order of decreasing impor-
tance to categorization. Manipulation of the learning set is expected
to yield information about the influence of a number of variables on
category learning and on subsequent categorization performance.
Frequency of values in the contrasting category will be varied
among values having the same focal frequency. Besides, in Chapter 6,
a delay of testing variabie is introduced to examine differential for-
getting of values of different cue validities. In Chapter 7, the
effect of contrasting category experience will also be studied by pro-
viding, apart from the focal category, either or not a contrasting
category in the learning task. Furthermore, co-occurrence of relevant
and irrelevant values is varied during learning, in order to test the
effects of conjoint frequency.
Effects :>f typicality of variants are studied bath in Chapter 6
and 7. The range of typicality experienced during learning is varied
by presenting exemplars composed of either a small range of typical
variants only, or a braad range of bath typical and atypical variants.
Atypical variants may slow down the learning rate, but on the other
hand they may result in a better representation of the category boun-
daries. The question will be addressed whether the latter means only
a better categorization of new atypical members of the focal category,
or whether it also means facilitation on boundary items of the con-
trasting category.
Finally, bath in Chapter 6 and 7, effects of the kind of informa-
tion given to the subjects during learning will be studied. Feedback
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information is either specific or nonspecific: in addition to the
proper category, an item's degree of category membership mayor may
not be indicated. Problems on the interpretation of the results con-
cerning this topic in Chapter 6, are the reason to introduce an obser-
vational category learning paradigm in Chapter 7. In an observational
paradigm, confusion of response and feedback information, which may be
complex in the specific information condition, is prevented because
subjects need not give a categorization response during learning in
this paradigm. They are required just to look at stimuli and the
feedback information in self-paced trials. In between the learning
blocks, subjects are tested a few times using short classification
tasks. Information on representativeness of an item is expected to
facilitate categorization performance.
The central concern of the study is 'Nhat it is that determines an
item's representativeness or typicality to a category. As a startingpoint, 
and in an attempt to provide a bridge between traditional con-
cept identification studies and the more recent accounts of natural
category representations, typicality variation will be applied to a
classical learning problem with defining values. Typicalityeffects
may not be inconsistent with the traditional view if they caD be shown
to occur in such learning tasks. Next, two main aspects of variation
within categories and their concurrent effects on categorization are
further investigated. These are frequency of occurrence of dimen-
sional values, and the typicality of the variants with which they
occur.
Regarding frequency, the question is whether and how frequency of
occurrence of values affects category representation. An important
question is whether people use information on occurrence of values in
contrasting categories when they learn same category, and whether
there are differential effects of forgetting on this point. Conjoint
frequency represents another important issue. Does conjoint frequency
affect categorization? will an irrelevant value be judged more
representative when it correlates with a relevant value as compared
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with zero correlation between these values? Furthermore, the question
is addressed whether feedback information on representativeness of an
item bas a benificial effect on category learning. Affirmative
answers are expected on all of these questions.
On variant typicality, the issue of boundary format ion is raised.
How is experience related to category width? Categorization perfor-
mance on category boundary exemplars will be studied on subjects vary-
ing in the range of variants they experienced during learening. Broad
rather than small range experience is expected to hamper category
learning, but to result in better categorization of atypical boundary
exemplars, both of the focal and of the contrast category.
Another research topic of the present thesis is the relationship
between information processing and physiological activity. The
research question on this issue will be specified in the next chapter.
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4. 
UNCERTAINTY REDUCTION AND
PHYSIOLOGICAL ACTIVITY
In this Chapter, the relationship between information processing
in cognitive tasks and autonomic physiological activity is introduced.
From time to time, cognitive psychologists are reminded that there is
more to human intelligence than just the pure cognitive system. The
importance of paying more attention to the physiology of cognitive
processes bas lately been emphasized a.o. by Rumelhart and Norman
(1981), Iran-Nejad and Ortony (1984), Nilsson (1984), and Posner
(1984). The present thesis does pay attention to this relationship by
studying the Galvanic Skin Response (GSR) as a possible index of
uncertainty reduction.
Cognitive processes are sometimes manifested in overt behavior.
However, more of ten they are not, in which case a variety of different
experimental methods is employed to infer these processes. It is at
this point that measurement of physiological indices of cognitive
processes can offer a substantive contribution. Physiological var i-
ables may serve as objective measures of specific cognitive processes.
This study focuses on one of these measures, the GSR.
The GSR bas been traditionally used as an indicator of the
Orienting Response (OR), and can be considered to be a reliable index
of this concept (e.g. van Olst, 1971; Maltzman, 1979; Barry, 1984).
When studying the OR literature, the frequency of occurrence of the
name of Sokolov is striking. Sokolov (e.g. 1969) bas developed a
large body of theory based on bis investigations of the OR. Central
in bis theory is the idea that neural models, i.e. representations of
experience, are built up in the brain. Neural models represent sys-
tems of expectancies or hypotheses. New experiences are compared to
these models The OR is suppressed if a match occurs. In case of a
a discrepancy between hypothesis and actual incoming
an OR is produced. This is manifested in physiological
mismat~h
ity.
The theory of Soko10v bas received substantia1 support, but on
the other hand it bas not been comp1ete1y without its critics. For
instance, Bernstein and Tay10r (1981) have argued that Soko10v fai1ed
to specify the inf1uence of stimulus significance on the OR. They
stated that a1though the 1iterature demonstrates c1ear1y that mismatch
can produce an OR, there is nothing to indicate that mismatch must do
SQ. Instead it is said that mismatch resu1ts in an OR on1y when the
stimulus is judged to be potentia11y usefu1 or significant in addition
to conveying informationa1 va1ue. The stimulus must p1ay a distinct
ro1e in the subject's task. The importance of stimulus significance
bas recent1y been supported by Wingard and Ma1tzman (1980). They
showed that subjects with a particu1ar recreationa1 interest (e.g.
surfing or chess), disp1ayed significant1y 1arger GSRs to slides dep-
icting scenes re1ated to their specific interest, as compared to otherrecreations.
Continuing the studies of De Swart and Das-Smaal (1976; 1979 a,b)
and of De Swart et al. (1981), the present thesis e1aborates further
on the hypothesis that GSR ref1ects uncertainty reduction provided by
feedback during category 1earning. Thus the question is whether or
not the GSR amplitude is re1ated to the change in subjective probabi1-
ity of hypotheses held by the subject. The re1ationship is important
because of the central ro1e of expectancy or uncertainty in current
mode1s of information processing (e.g. Neisser, 1978).
Different operations have been used in the measurement of uncer-
tainty or expectancy. In contrast to studies in which expectancy is
inferred from the a priori probabi1ity of a stimulus, the present
study re1ies on changes in subjective posterior probabi1ity. In
category 1earning tasks, changes in probabi1ities of hypotheses resu1t
from feedback. Many studies have shown that subjects change their
hypothesis on1y af ter disconfirmation (e.g. Fa1magne, 1970; Coltheart,
1973; White, 1974; De Swart and Das-Smaal, 1976, 1979a). If a
categorization turns out to be incorrect (disconfirmation), the
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probability that the selected hypothesis is true reduces to zero. In
case of correct categorizations (confirmations), the subject gains
Borne confidence and stays with hLS hypothesis. Usings Bayes' theorem,
De Swart and Das-Smaal (1979b) showed that these different kinds of
feedback result in different amounts of uncertainty reduction. The
current study investigated the effects of different types of feedback
(i.e. noninformative, confirming, and disconfirming), on GSR during a
category learning task. GSR is expected to increase from noninforma-
tive to confirming to disconfirming feedback.
Moreover, subjects' confidence about categorization is measured
directly in the present studies. De Swart and Das-Smaal (1979b) and
De Swart et al. (1981) showed that sorting the data according to con-
fidence ratings leads to an even better understanding of the effects
of confirming and disconfirming feedback on physiological indices in
terms of uncertainty reduction. In the present study, therefore, sub-
jects will continually be asked to estimate the certainty that their
categorization was right. The hypothesis that the GSR amplitude
varies systematically with the confidence of the subject in hts
hypothesis and the type of feedback he receives, will be tested in a
variety of ways both in chapter 5 and 6 of the present thesis.
Regarding the "significance hypothesis" of Bernstein and Taylor
(1981) mentioned above, in the present studies significance is ensured
by task relevance. In category learning tasks, confirming and discon-
firming feedback are highly task relevant since the different types of
feedback play a distinct role in the information processing activities
of the subject.
In conclusion, the aLm of GSR measurement in the present study is
to test the hypothesis that GSR reflects the amount of uncertainty
reduced by feedback in a category learning task.
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5. TYPICALITY, PHYSIOLOGICAL ACTIVITY AND
CONCEPT IDENTIFICA TION*
.?:.!.. Synopsis
The extent to which instances are good or
paar examples of their categories (typicality) was
varied in a concept identification (Cl) task.
Typicality was first established for the kind of
artificial material traditionally used in Cl tasks
(experiment 1). This material was employed in a
Cl task (experiment 2) with a variety of dependentvariables, 
including the galvanic skin response
(GSR). To test the generality of the results,
more realistic stimuli were employed (experiment 3
and 4). The results showed that typicality influ-
enced performance on the Cl task, that the GSR is
primari1y related to uncertainty reduction, that
the findings with arbitrary materials are repli-
cated with more meaningful materials, and that the
multi-hypothesis sampling theory of Levine is sup-
ported by the findings.
5.2. lntroduction
--
Most of the "classicai" studies of concept identification (Cl) in
the tradition of Bruner et al. (1956) can be criticized on severalpoints. 
In a Cl task the subject is presented with a series of
stimuli, Borne of which are instances of the concept, and others of
which are not. The subject is asked to categorize each stimulus.
Subsequently feedback is given regarding the correct categorization.
One point of criticism concerns the equivalence of instances as
members of a category, and the discreteness of their attributes. In
many of the traditional studies the discrete values of each dimension
were chosen because of their discriminability, and the chosen values
remained constant during the experiment (e.g. only one value of red,
*) E.A. Das-Smaal & J.H. De Swart. Typicality, physiological ac-
tivity and concept identification. ~ Psychologica, 1981, ~,
1-24.
6. VARIATION WITHIN CA TEGORIES*
§'..!.. Synopsis
Two aspects of variation within categories,
relating to different models of categorization,
were investigated -frequency of dimensional
values and typicality differences within values.
The influence of range of typicality experienced
during learning and of informational value of
feedback was also studied. Finally, differential
forgetting of values was examined.
In the experiment subjects learned to
categorize faces, and then performed a classifica-
tion test taak and pairwise comparisons of faces.
A variety of dependent variables was employed,
including the galvanic skin response (GSR).
Typicality and frequency of values appeared
to influence categorization performance indepen-
dent of each other. It was concluded that bath
prototype distance models and frequency models
explain different aspects of variation within the
same categories, and that models of categorization
should account for frequency of values in con-
trasting categories. Results showed furthermore
(1) the influence of typicality range on the
extension of a category; (2) no influence of
specific feedback regarding representativeness of
a face; (3) leas decay with a distinctive value;
and (4) a positive relationship between uncer-
tainty reduction and GSR.
6.2. INTRODUCTION
--
Traditional work on categorization treated all exemplars of a
category as equally good examples of the category. This view bas been
criticized a.o. by Rosch (1973) and by Das-Smaal and De Swart (1981),
who argued that categorization models must be capable of representing
*) E.A. Das-Smaal & J.H. De Swart. Variation within categories.
~ Psychologica, 1984, ~, 165-192.
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7.
EFFECTS OF CONTRASTING CATEGORY,
CONJOINT FREQUENCY AND
TYPICALITY ON CA TEGORIZA TION*
l..!.. Synopsis
Two experiments were conducted to investigate
whether (a) experience with a contrasting
category, (b) conjoint frequency of dimensional
values, (c) range of typicality of values, and (d)
type of information administered during learning
influenced subsequent test performance.
Each experiment began with an observational
category learning task, employing faces as
stimuli. This was followed by a categorization
test task and by pairwise comparisons of faces.
Influence of a contrasting category was studied in
Experiment 1 by varying frequency of values of the
contrasting category, and in Experiment 2 by
either including or not including a contrasting
category in the learning task.
Results indicated that (a) categorization is
influenced by experience with a contrasting
category, (b) conjoint frequency enhances the
importance of values to a category, (c) broad typ-
icality range experience reduces typicality
differences among exemplars of a category, whereas
small range experience diminishes differences in a
contrasting category, and (d) information on
representativeness of exemplars does not facili-
tate subsequent test performance.
The implications of the results for categori-
zat ion models are discussed.
7.2. lntroduction
--
Various models have been proposed as to the basis of categoriza-
tion, several of which appear to be viable. One class of models,
prototype-distance models (e.g. Reed, 1972), hold that a central
representation (prototype) is abstracted from the experienced
*) E.A. Das-Smaal & J.H. de Swart. Effects of contrasting
category, conjoint frequency and typicality on categorization.
Due to be published in: ~ Psychologica, 1986, ~: 1.
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8. RETROSPECT
ODe way to deal with the variety of information in our environ-
ment is to form and make use of category representations, as was
argued in Cbapter 1. The issue regarding category representation that
is focused upon in this study, concerns the memory storage of within-
category variation. The two opposite theoretical positions relevant
to tbis subject are the classical view with the defining values
assumption, and the prototype approach (see Chapter 2). In the former
view no aspect of within-category variation is represented, whereas
the latter position in Lts extreme version holds that every aspect of
within-category variation is represented. However, as Palmer (1978)
already noted, underlying this dichotomy is a broad range of possible
tbeories.
To attack the question of what aspects of variation within
categories are represented, and bow specifically they are represented,
the present study considered tbe storage of information on frequency
of dimensional values, and on typicality of the variants with which
theyoccur. These variables represent different aspects of variation
within categories (see Chapter 3). Their relative contribution to the
learning of categories and the format ion of category boundaries was
studied, as weIl as their influence following learning on categoriza-
tion and typicality judgments of old and novel exemplars and non-
exemplars.
~..!.. Frequency ~ ~ validity
Frequency of occurrence of values in the focal category as com-
pared to their occurrence in the contrasting category, was expressed
in terms of cue validity. This measure gives an objective indication
of the degree to which a value provides a correct basis for a categor-
ization decision. The question is what subjects learn from this state
of affairs about the actual goodness of a value; i.e. to what degree
is it used and relied upon in subjective judgments following learning.
In answering this question, special attention was paid to the influ-
ence of occurrence of a value in a contrast category, and to conjoint
frequencies of values.
The influence of frequency of occurrence of values among con-
trasting category items on categorizing focal category exemplars was a
very robust finding, coming from converging sources. It has been
demonstrated repeatedly, employing a variety of learning paradigms,
methods of testing, and dependent variables. In all experiments
described in Chapter 6 and 7, high total cue validity of exemplars
facilitated learning and classification following learning. The
results on categorization with value omission as weil as on the addi-
tional task of mentioning the characteristic values add to the evi-
dence. Furthermore, when learning had to take place from focal
category exemplars only, without experiencing a contrast category,
categorization was guided by focal frequency of the dimensional
values.
When values with the same cue validity but with different fre-
quencies of occurrence were compared, focal frequency showed LtS own
influence, apart from cue validity. Values of higher frequency were
judged more typical. However, distinctive values -that is, dimen-
sional values that occur frequently and exclusively in the focal
category- appeared to be the most typical and most important ones to
classification following learning. Delay of testing (see Chapter 6)
showed that this was even more so with the passing of time.
The apparent conclusion from the findings is that people collect
considerable knowledge of the frequency with which dimensional values
occur in particular categories during learning. This knowledge is not
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restricted to just the focal category, but also extends to the con-
trast category. People are able to use this knowledge in order to
evaluate relative frequencies, that is, occurrence in ODe category as
compared with occurrence in a contrast category. Three remarks have
to be made on this conclusion, and we will turn to them next.
~..!...!.. Automatic encoding ~ frequency information
The results on additional feedback information on frequency are
relevant to the question whether or not frequency information is
learned automatically. Same cognitive processes require sustained
effort or conscious control on the part of the subject. Other cogni-
tive operations can be accomplished automatically, requiring little
cognitive capacity (e.g. Shiffrin and Schneider, 1977). Hasher and
Chromiak (1977), Kellogg et al. (1978), and Zacks et al. (1982) have
suggested that frequency information is processed automatically during
learning. On the other hand, Greene (1984) and Hockley (1984) argued
that there is not enough evidence tor automatic encoding of frequency
information. Experiments in Chapter 6 and 7 showed that subjects
encoded frequency information effectively under conditions of non-
specific feedback, despite the tact that they did not receive direct
information concerning frequency of occurrence. Beyond that, the
present results showed that decisions involving frequency judgments
are not enhanced by the availability of direct information on fre-
quency. In the experiment described in Chapter 7, measures were taken
to exclude a possible explanation in terms of shortage of processing
time and confusion of response and feedback. In spite of these pre-
cautions, advantage of presenting additional information on frequency
was not forthcoming. These results argue that the encoding of fre-
quency information is an automatic process. For, in contrast to
automatic operations, effortful processes are assumed to profit trom
additional help.
Frequency information may be encoded automatically. However, it
should be recognized that the frequency information stored can be used
to further conscious processing, tor instance, to generate hypotheses,
which may be done consciously (Kellogg, 1982). Evidence that people
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do, 
in fact, generate hypotheses about the relevant values of a
category by selecting high-frequency values comes from experiments by,
for instance, Haygood et al. (1970) and by Ke11ogg (1980). In
category 1earning tasks, subjects appeared to hypothesize high-
frequency va1ues much more of ten as wou1d be expected by chance.
8.1.2. Task demands
A second remark on the conclusion regarding frequency effects is
the following. An unanticipated finding was the following difference
between the categorization and the pairwise comparison task. Dif-
ferential performance on focal category exemplars of lower total cue
validity was found between these two tasks in all experiments. The
results suggest that frequency in the contrast category is weighted
more heavily in categorization tasks than in tasks that require judg-ments 
of representativeness of exemplars regarding the focal category.
Unlike in categorization decisions, differences among categories are
not so much the issue in the latter kind of task. Therefore, in thatcase, 
distinctiveness, as determined by occurrence in contrastcategories, 
is deemed less important and receives less weight. This
is not to say that influence of occurrence in a contrast category is
not at all important in a paired comparisons task or in the additional
task of mentioning the values typical to the focal category. The
present studies have shown that it is. However, because the above
mentioned disparity showed up repeatedly, this points to the relevance
of task analysis.
Effects of task demands are also described by Medin and Smith
(1984). They borrowed a distinction from Miller and Johnson-Laird.
Miller and Johnson-Laird (1976) distinguished between the care and the
identification procedure of a category. The care, according to Medin
and Smith, contains the defining values of a category. The identifi-
cation procedure contains values that are used in categorization, and
these need not be the defining values. Medin and Smith further sug-
gest, and cite same evidence, that different tasks may demand dif-
ferent information usage. The identification procedure is used to
identify objects, whereas the care will be used whenever someone is
120
asked to back-up or justify the categorization decision (e.g. how do
you know this is an exemplar of category X?). In the present view,
this means that information on distinctiveness, which is used in the
categorization decision, is of less relevance with justification,
because this implies concentr~tion on only ODe category.
As outlined in the discussion of Chapter 6, ODe interesting
implication of the finding on task demands is that information on fre-
quency in the focal category and information on frequency in contrast
categories has to be separately accessible in memory, and not already
joined in the measure of cue validity. Cue validity then, may be
either computed when neccessary, or stored in addition to frequencies
in focal and contrast category. Perhaps what is required is a dis-
tinction such as made by Milier and Johnson-Laird, between categories
and procedures for using categories. Having knowledge of occurrence
in contrasting categories does not imply that this knowledge is always
used in performance.
Thus the contention that a category consists of certain values is
not enough. It does not say how those values are weighted or
integrated when people use that category in same particular situation.
An account is needed of the manner in which a whole is constructed
from the parts in each case. And as for storage, the information must
be stored such that it enables us to use that information in a flexi-
bIe way. Task and contextual factors'may give rise to a kind of
momentary relevant activation pattern in which certain values may tem-
porarily be of more importance than others. For instance, different
values are distinctive when a chicken (as a domestic animal) is com-
pared with a horse than when a chicken (as food) is compared with
another kind of meat. Regarding context, Barsalou (1982) makes a dis-
tinction between context-independent and context-dependent information
in categories. Context-independency arises automatically from a high
frequency of occurrence in the focal category. Context-independent
information is activated on all occasions. Context-dependent informa-
tion, on the other hand, refers to proper ties that are activated only
in certain contexts. In this view, information on distinctiveness,
and on degree of occurrence of a value in a contrast category, can be
considered context-dependent information.
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A post-hoc interpretation of the findings on a more elementary
level of theorizing may serve to integrate the frequency results.
Suppose the following. As a part of a momentary activation pattern,
dimensional values activate categories in which they have occurred, to
an extent corresponding with registered prior frequency of occurrence.Thus, 
a common value activates bath the focal and the contrast
category, although the focal category will be activated more. A dis-
tinctive value, however, activates only the focal category, because it
bas never occurred in the contrast category. It is furthermore
assumed that contrasting categories inhibit each other when they are
activated, a suggestion that comes trom Wickelgren (1981) and trom
Rumelhart and McClelland (1982). It follows that the net activation
of the focal category will be higher trom a distinctive value than
trom a common value, even if they occur with the same frequency in the
focal category, like in the present study. In a categorization task,
the decision may then involve determination of which one of the
categories at issue is activated most. A pairwise comparison task, on
the other hand, concentrates on the focal category. It involves
determining which one of two exemplars is more strongly related to the
focal category. In such a task the focal category may be primed, and
this diminishes the relative influence of inhibition by way of the
contrast category.
~.!..~. 
Conjoint frequency
In the interpretation just mentioned, the effects of conjoint
frequency, which were evidenced in the present study, also have to be
accounted faro Therefore, it is necessary to assume excitatory rela-
tions between values, increasing in strength or number with increasing
co-occurrence frequency. This assumption can clear up a controversy
on conjoint frequencyeffects. As was pointed out in the discussion
of Experiment 2 in Chapter 7, the effectivity of conjoint frequency
shows up when at least one of the values is important to categoriza-
tion. Conjoint frequency increases the typicality of an irrelevant
value when it correlates with a value that is important to categoriza-
tion. This explains why Kellogg (1981) did not find any conjoint
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frequency effect using values that were all irrelevant to categoriza-
tion. Excitatory relations between two irrelevant values do nothing
of significance to increase the activation of the category. However,
when at least one relevant value is concerned, an increased activation
of the category is the result, facilitating categorization and
increasing typicality judgments. The irrelevant value activates the
category by war of its relationship with the highly characteristicvalue.
The assumption that effects of conjoint frequency are constrained
to situations in which at least one of the joint values is relevant or
characteristic to the category also solves a major problem signaled
bath by Reed (1982) and by Medin an Smith (1984). Theyargue that it
is not probable that all possible correlations among values are taken
into account, because they are toa numerous. The condition of
relevancy of at least one of the conjoint values mayalso in this
respect appear to be an important constraint on the correlations that
are taken into account.
Another interesting potential explanation bears on the Gestalt
claim that "the whole is more than the sum of the parts". It may be
speculated that the formation of interrelations by conjoint frequency,
and the resulting additional activation through mutual excitation,
gives rise to same of these effects. The results of the present study
indicate that correlation of values enhances the typicality of the
"whole" stimulus containing the correlated values, relative to non-
redundant combinatations. This shows that conjoint occurrence of
values during learning can cause the whole to be perceived as more
than the sum of ,its parts. The existence of a predominant manner of
organizing the parts of a stimulus may, in a comparable war, be due to
special interrelations between values in memory, whether they are
learned or physiologically prewired. Effects of learning the interre-
lations have been established in the present study.
!..?c.. ~ aspects ~ variation
The frequency aspect of within-category variation has been con-
sidered in some detail. What has not as Jet been accounted for is the
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aspect of variance within dimensional values, the range of variants
that are permissible for a certain value. This is another aspect that
bas been investigated in the present study. It pertains to variants
that differ in typicality. The contribution of each aspect, frequency
and variant typicality, to categorization was assessed by varying them
together in the same experiments on the same values. Each farm of
variation had its own type of influence, and the aspects appeared not
to interact. As described in section 3.1.4., the frequency and vari-
ant typicality aspects have been accounted for by a frequency and a
prototype-distance model, respectively. The conclusion from the
present studies is that the two types of model are complementary
rather than contradictory. Both aspects together should be accounted
for in one categorization model, if it is to be a viable one.
As was suggested in the general discussion of Chapter 7, a fre-
quency model can be used for discrete as well as continuous values
when it is assumed that the continuous dimensions are made up of
intervals (Neumann, 1977). Such a model can be equally employed for
categories with and without defining values.
The term well-defined describes those categories which have
values that are bath necessary and sufficient for determining category
membership. Categories without such values, that instead have values
that are only more or less representative of a category, can be termed
fuzzy or ill-defined. Although for these categories it would always
be possible to find same complicated "scientific" rule that could be
used for classification (Martin & Caramazza, 1980), the rule for ill-
defined cat~gories may be so complex that subjects will have toa much
difficulty in determining it. Following this definition, the category
structure employed in the experiments of Chapter 6 and 7 is an ill-
defined one, whereas the categories used in the Chapter 5 experiments
can be considered well-defined.
It appeared from various postacquisition tasks in the present
experiments that also for ill-defined categories holds that the most
frequent values, with lowest frequency in a contrasting category, are
learned and considered most important to a category. This result does
not deny the possibility, but argues against the necessity of defining
values as part of a category representation. The latter account also~
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suggests that there is 1ess difference between we11-defined and i11-
defined categories than has been argued for instance by Rosch (1975).
~.l. 
Exemplar representation
In discussing the various approaches to categorization, we have
not yet mentioned the possibility that, rather than information being
integrated in same fashion, each experienced exemplar may be stored
and remembered individually. Support for such a model comes from
Medin & Schaffer (1978). The exemplar view, however, has severalweaknesses. 
First of all it predicts good memory for all the learnedexemplars. 
In contrast. it has in fact been demonstrated repeatedly
that memory for specific items is very paar (a.o. Bourne & O'Banion,
1969). Furthermore. having categories represented by exemplars only,
provides none of the advantages of categorization mentioned by Bruner
et al. (1956). such as efficiency and uncertainty reduction (see
Chapter 1). The exemplar view also has severe problems in represent-
ing generalized knowledge that pertains to dimensional values, such as
knowledge on conjoint frequencies. or frequency of values in contrast-
ing categories. The special importance of distinctive values. which
was established in the present studies, as well as the effects of con-
joint frequency are not in favour of a category representation based
on exemplars only. Of course, everything that in other models is sup-
posed to be abstracted. can in principle be computed rather than
stored directly, but this would require a great amount of computation
in each case. which is not very parsimonious. Also the result from
the experiments in Chapter 5. that typicality bas differential influ-
ence for relevant and for irrelevant dimensional values within the
same exemplars. argues against exemplar representation. Finally, as
Smith and Medin (1980) pointed out. there are two special problems.
In the first place. the question is what is left that joins the exem-
plars into one category. I.t is not clear what constitutes a category
at all when only exemplars are represented. In the second place.
there is a problem about what is done when only summary information
about a category is given and no exemplars are experienced. such as is
the case when a category is learned by being told rather than by
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examples. 
The solution of ~~ese problems requires some kind of infor-
mation abstraction.
~.~. 
Typicality Eo!. ~ variants
Dimensional values may vary in their frequency of occurrence, and
this bas consequences for categorization as discussed previously.However, 
for continuous values holds that the values may vary in typ i-
cality of the variants with which they occur, of course within certainranges. 
The present study showed that this, apart from frequency has
other, unrelated consequences, to which we will now turn.
Typicality variation was applied to well-defined as weil as to
ill-defined categories. Typicality effects have been established in
both kinds of category structure, indicating that even the format ion
of traditional, well-defined categories is affected by the typicality
of value variants with which the category is learned. This argues
against a strictly all-or-none structure of categories, in the sense
that no instance is a better exemplar than any other. Categories do
possess internal structure, as indicated by the typicality effects.
However, the effects were restricted to values that were relevant to
the categorization decision. It should be noted here that typicality
and relevance are not the same thing. Typicality bas to do with the
range of a value, whereas relevance bas to do with Lts probability of
occurrence. Category learning was facilitated by high rather than low
typical value variants when relevant values were concerned. No such
difference was found with irrelevant values. The discrepancy may be
explained by an interaction between the selectivity of attent ion and
the knowledge that is built up (e.g. Das-Smaal et al., in prepara-
tion). In the beginning of category learning, there is no category
information available in memory to direct attention to specific
stimulus values. The analysis of the stimulus is data driven, prob-
ably influenced by salience of values. However, in the course of
learning, the analysis becomes more "top down", guided by hypotheses
or expectations. The information that bas been gathered is used to
direct attention to values deemed relevant, the latter being guided by
frequency. Finally, the learner will end up with detailed
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representations of information on at least the focused values. The
information that is stored includes various details about frequencies
as weIl as information on their typicality ranges, as bas been shown
in the present study. Values considered irrelevant to category
abstraction may be represented incompletely or may not be remembered
at allo This is indicated by a recognition experiment of Nickerson
and Adams (1979). They showed that whereas knowledge of colour and
size of a U.S. penny is good, knowledge of its visual details ispoor. 
Dimensions such as colour and size are relevant to the distinc-
tion between a penny and other coins. On the contrary, the additional
details are irrelevant to the purposes for which pennies are employed.
Hence they apparently do not receive much attention.
The idea of stimulus analysis being guided by expectations is
central to schema theories (Neisser, 1967). Current experiences are
assimilated to past experienc~s, and what we subsequently perceive is
influenced by these experiences. Thus, perception contains the memory
of earlier encounters, as Arnold, (1984) put it. As aresuit, the
accounts of stimuli may be different from the stimuli that evoked
them. The present study's findings on the effects of typicality range
experience serve to illustrate this point. Two groups of subjects
differed in range of typicality over which the value variants of the
stimuli were varied during learning. The groups subsequently appeared
to respond in different ways to the same interstimulus distance. The
"psychological" distance between the stimuli from two categories was
larger when a small rather than broad range of typical variants was
experienced during learning. It shows that prior experience can make
a significant difference in typicality judgments and in subjective
intercategorical distance.
~.~. Category boundaries
ODe problem that bas been neglected in models of categorization
that allow for variation within categories, is the problem of category
boundaries. It may occur that an item is not clearly either a member
or a non-member of a category. The problem is how much discrepancy is
allowable among members of a category. In section 2.2. we argued that
boundaries are dependent on context. The question addressed in this
study concerns the influence of learning on the range of discrepancies
that is still acceptable. Atypical exemplars are sooner accepted as
category members if one's category ranges are wide rather than narrow.
Although there may be individual differences in the category ranges
that people keep for themselves (Detweiler, 1975), the present results
generally show how ranges can be determined by learning, and how range
experience influences within-category variation. As was to be
expected, experience with a braad variant range resulted in a rela-
tively large extension of the focal category. It also resulted in
better categorization of navel atypical focal category exemplars.
Atypical boundary instances of the contrast category, however, were
not categorized better by braad than by small range experienced sub-
jects. This may have been due to fast categorization of contrast
items by default following learning in the small range condition. The
explanation is that because of the small extension that small range
subjects formed of the focal category, contrasting category items
clearly are not members of such a small focal category. Therefore,
once the small focal category is learned, contrast items can be rela-
tively easily rejected. This could have compensated a benificial
effect of braad rather than small range experience on categorization
of the contrast items. The categorization by default explanation fol-
lowing small range learning experience was tested and supported by
several results described in Chapter 7.
The range of variants that was experienced, influenced typicality
judgments. A recurrent finding was the lack of typicality differences
in the focal category following braad range experience. A third range
condition, with braad range experience but a limited number of dif-
ferent variants within this range, showed that the lack of typicality
differences was indeed due to the width of the category, and not to
the greater number of variants. Thus extending the range of variants
causes a reduction of typicality differences among focal category
exemplars. This finding agrees with the model of stimulus discrimina-
tion of Gravetter and Lockhead (1973), which was mentioned in Chapter
6.
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The results on typicality range show how the manner in which
something is perceived or interpreted can change as a result ofexperience. 
Category learning can bring about such changes in the
cognitive system, causing a different interaction of the cognitive
system with recurring stimuli than before learning took place.
~.~. 
Hypothesis testing
Regarding the way in which people proceed when they learn
categories by examples, a very influential idea states that people
acquire categories by a process of selecting and testing hypotheses
(e.g. Bruner et al., 1956; Levine, 1975). As mentioned before, the
findings on storage and usage of information on frequency of
occurrence in a categorization learning task can be reconciled with
hypothesis testing theory by the assumption that frequency information
is used to select hypotheses. Haygood et al. (1970) a.o., and more
recently Kellogg (1980), have evidenced this view. One special theory
on hypothesis formation, Levine's (1969) multi-hypothesis sampling
theory, was supported in the present study by results described in
Chapter 5. An illustration of multi-hypothesis sampling in a real-
lire situation is given by Reed (1982). Reed describes how hypothesis
testing is applicated in a task that involves diagnosing medical prob-
lems. Results on how physicians attempt to diagnose a disease agree
with Levine's theory. It appeared that physicians start to farm
hypotheses early in the examination. Then they monitor a subset of
about three hypotheses at a time, and this subset remains fairly con-
stant through different stages of examination. The results show that
more than one hypothesis or expectation can be active and evaluated
simultaneously. As was outlined in Chapter 4, many studies have shown
that in a category learning paradigm such as was used in the present
studies, one of these hypotheses is employed as a basis for response,
and that subjects reject this hypothesis only af ter disconfirmation of
the categorization response.
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~.l. Uncertainty .reduction and ~~~
It bas been proposed, on the basis of earlier categorization
experiments (De Swart and Das-Smaal, 1976; 1979a, b), that the ampli-
tude of the Galvanic Skin Response (GSR), is a manifestation of the
amount of uncertainty reduction caused by feedback in such tasks.
This is consistent with Sokoiov's (1969) model of the Orienting
Response (OR), which provides an analogue at the neural level of the
cognitive process of testing hypotheses. As discussed in chapter 4,
it also agrees with Bernstein's (1969) significance hypothesis, since
feedback clearly provides highly task-relevant information. Stated in
terms of Pribram and McGuiness (1975), the evaluation of the feedback
information value indicates the degree to which it cal is for "context
updating", and it is argued here that this is reflected by GSR.
In the present study, subjects were required to categorize
stimuli and to indicate the extent of their confidence in their
categorization response. Following these responses, feedback was
given. GSR was measured during this feedback. Thus, influence from
response selection and execution processes on GSR measurement was can-
celed out here. GSR appeared to vary with the subjective amount of
information delivered by physically identical feedback stimuli. In a
variety of ways it bas been shown that the higher the subjective
information value of the feedback, the higher the GSR.
The results described in Chapter 5 show that GSR indicates uncer-
tainty reduction more than task difficulty. The farmer aspect of
information processing bears an aspect of expectation, based on a
subject's hypothesis which is to be evaluated. The lat ter aspect of
information processing refers to mental laad or cognitive effort that
bas to be spent on a task. It is conceivable that different physio-
logical variables have different psychological correlates. Whereas
GSR may be primarily understood as an indicator of uncertainty reduc-
tion, Janisse (1977) suggested that the pupillary response is superior
to GSR as an index of task difficulty. In a category learning task,
employing bath GSR and Heart Rate (HR) as an indicator of autonomic
physiological activity, De Swart and Das-Smaal (1976a) showed that HR
is a less suitable measure in such a cognitive task. On the other
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hand, 
the amplitude of P300, like GSR, has been evidenced as an indi-
cator of uncertainty reduction about hypotheses under test (De Swart
et al., 1981; Donchin, 1975). The exact relationship among these and
other physiological indices has to be cleared up by future research.
In Chapter 6, the specific feedback condition provided an oppor-
tunity to test the relationship between GSR and uncertainty reduction
in Jet another way than was doDe in our previous studies, and in an
ill- rather than well-defined category learning task. Again, support
was found on the idea that GSR reflects the amount of uncertainty
reduced by feedback in a category learning task. A physiological
measure like GSR as an index of a special cognitive activity in such
tasks, has the advantage above other dependent measures that it pro-
vides direct information on covert cognitive processes. Therefore it
is concluded that GSR amplitude provides a useful supplementary in-
strument in cognitive research.
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SUMMAR Y
This thesis concerns the memory storage of category information. It
presents an analysis of several aspects of variation among category
exemplars. For each of these aspects the effects on the way that a
category is remembered following experience with exemplars and non-
exemplars were assessed. In addition, the study considers the connec-
tion between cognitive processes and physiological activity.
In the experiments described in Chapter 5, typicality of value
variants was varied in traditional category learning problems with
defining values. Typicality of value variants appeared to influence
learning performance. The effect, however, differed for relevant and
irrelevant values. Typicality of relevant values facilitated category
learning, whereas typi~ality of irrelevant values did not affect
categorization performance. The latter discrepancy can be explained
by interaction between selective attention and the developing category
representation (see 8.4).
Different aspects of within-category variation in categories
without defining values are the focus of Chapter 6 and 7. Two types
of categorization roDdels that are of ten contrasted are relevant in
this respect. These are frequency roDdels and prototype-distance
models (see Chapter 2). In accordance with these models, two main
aspects of within-category variation were investigated, i.e. frequency
of dimensional values and the typicality of the variants with which
theyoccur. A variety of methods was employed to examine their influ-
ence on category learning and LtS results. Frequency of values and
variant typicality appeared to independently influence categorizationperformance. 
It was concluded that frequency and prototype-distance
roDdels are complementary rather than contradictory. They explain dif-
ferent aspects of variation within the same categories.
Regarding specific frequency effects, the experiments showed how
frequency of values not only in the focal, but also in the contrast
category influences category representation. The latter aspect is an
important one that should be, but is not always accounted for in
categorization roDdels. A task effect appeared with respect to the
influence of frequency in the contrast category. Implications are
discussed in section 8.1.2.
The question whether or not conjoint occurrence of values affects
categorization, represents another theoretically controversial issue
(see 3.1.2.). From the present results it appeared that the typical-
ity of an irrelevant value is enhanced when it correlates with a value
that is important to categorization. The latter aspect may offer a
solution to the above-mentioned controversy (see 8.1.3.). In all,
subjective importance of values to categorization was clearly demon-
strated to be determined by these frequency variables. Another vari-
able, delay of testing, showed that distinctive values are more resis-
tant to decay.
Finally, an experimental manipulation related to frequency was
whether or not subjects received additional feedback information on
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frequency. 
Additional information had no benificial effect on
category learning. In section 8.1.1. this finding is discussed in
connection with automatic encoding of frequency information.
With variant typicality the problem of category bounderies wasraised. 
This is an of ten neglected issue in models oÎ categorization.
In the present study, the influence of range of variant typicality
experienced during learning was investigated. As expected, broad
rather than narrow range experience resulted in a larger extension of
the focal category, with better categorization of atypical focal
category boundery exemplars. However, atypical boundery items of the
contrast category were not categorized better. The range of variants
also influenced item typicality judgments. Within the focal category
these judgments diverged relatively more following small range experi-ence. 
Narrow as compared with broad range experience furthermore had
the effect of polarizing the categories, i.e. the same physical dis-
tances were judged differently depending range experience.
Finally, the relationship was investigated between information
processing in categorization tasks, and physiological activity as
measured by the amplitude of the Galvanic Skin Response (GSR). In a
variety of ways it was shown in Chapter 5 and 6 that the higher the
subjective information value of the feedback, the higher the GSR. It
is argued that GSR measurement as an indication of uncertainty reduc-
tion provides a useful supplementary instrument in cognitive research.
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